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INTRODUCTION
Effective competition for local monopoly cable systems would seem
to offer a natural solution to nagging problems widely attributed to the
cable industry, such as high prices and poor service. In regulatory and
t This Article is based on DAVID WATERMAN & ANDREW A. WEISS, VERTICAL
INTEGRATION IN CABLE TELEVISION (Sept. 17, 1993) (unpublished monograph, American
Enterprise Inst.). A recent version of this Article was presented at the Telecommunications
Policy Research Conference, Solomon's Island, Md., October 1994.
* Associate Professor, Department of Telecommunications, Indiana University, (812)
855-6170. I am grateful to Michael L. Katz, and especially to J. Gregory Sidak and Andrew
A. Weiss, for their comments and contributions to this work. I remain responsible for all
shortcomings.
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legislative proceedings leading up to the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992,' however, potential or existing
competitors to local cable systems complained that cable programming
networks2 either refused to do business with them or offered them
programming only on discriminatory terms.3 These competitors include
home satellite dish (HSD) owners and program distributors, satellite master
antenna system (SMATV) operators, multichannel multipoint distribution
system (MMDS) operators, "overbuilt" cable system operators, and
operators of direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems.4 According to these
complaints, established cable system operators are to blame for pressuring
the networks, many of which are vertically affiliated with those operators,
to engage in this discrimination and thus handicap the cable operators'
competitors.
As a result of the 1992 Cable Act, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC or Commission) established regulations intended to
encourage competition for established cable operators by ensuring that these
alternative multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) have
1. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections 47 U.S.C.
§§ 521-611 (Supp. V 1993)).
2. Throughout this Article, the term "network" is used to refer to program suppliers,
as distinct from a network of hardware serving communications needs at the facilities
level-such as local exchange carriers, satellite master antenna television systems, or even
cable systems themselves. Facilities-level firms that offer or might offer video services are
either termed "cable systems" or following FCC parlance, as "alternative multichannel video
programming distributors (MVPDs)."
3. Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Cable Television Regulation Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications and Finance of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1989: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Media Ownership: Diversity and Concentra-
tion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Competitive Issues
in the Cable Television Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies
and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)
[hereinafter Cable Competition Hearings]; In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the
Commission's Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable TV Service, Report, 5 FCC Red.
4962, paras. 112-30 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 FCC Cable Report].
4. As a result of the FCC's 1992 "video dialtone" decision, local exchange carriers are
also beginning to offer common carrier video services and could soon be allowed to enter
the market as full-fledged providers of cable services. In re Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-
Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-63.58, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,
7 FCC Red. 5069, para. 269 n.15 (1992) [hereinafter Video Dialtone Order].
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adequate access to programming. 5 As required by Section 19 of the Act,
the FCC promulgated regulations on April 1, 1993, that require cable
program suppliers in which cable systems have an "attributable interest" to
make programming available on the same terms and conditions to all
competing delivery systems.' Based on the language of Section 19, the
FCC singles out vertically integrated cable program suppliers-which it
defines as those in which any cable operator has a 5 percent or greater
equity interest-for specific regulations.7 Among other restraints, the
regulations prohibit these integrated program suppliers from any price
discrimination in the distribution of cable programming in any market,
except for differences the programmer can justify on the basis of costs,
volume differences, creditworthiness, or similar factors. Vertically
integrated programmers are also prohibited from entering into exclusive
dealing contracts (or, implicitly, from refusing to deal) with any cable
operator unless the program supplier can demonstrate to the FCC that those
contracts are in the public interest. 8 As the FCC notes, Section 19 also
prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" by "all cable operators," so that cable operators do not have to
be vertically integrated to be subject to a program access complaint.' Apart
from this general language which applies indirectly to the behavior of
nonintegrated cable program suppliers, the FCC's program access
regulations apply only to vertically integrated programming suppliers.
The 1990 FCC Cable Report on the cable industry expressed a
favorable view of industry vertical integration in general, but its conclu-
sions on program access were less sanguine." The Report concluded that
"vertically integrated cable operators often have the ability to deny
multichannel video programming distributors access to cable programming
services in which such cable operators hold ownership interests, and there
is considerable anecdotal evidence that some have used this ability in
anticompetitive ways."" The singling out of vertically integrated cable
5. In re Implementation of §§ 12 and 19 of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992: Dev. of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming
Distribution and Carriage, First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 3359, para. 9 (1993)
[hereinafter First Report & Order on Competition and Diversity]. Section 19 of the Act
creates a new § 628 of the Communications Act of 1934 which embodies the program
access provisions of § 19. Id. paras. 1-3.
6. Id.
7. Id. para. 11.
8. Id. paras. 16, 62-67. This same provision also applies to "all satellite broadcast
programming vendors" (that is, superstations), whether integrated or not. Id. para. 10.
9. Id. par. 10.
10. See 1990 FCC Cable Report, supra note 3.
11. Id. para. 128.
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programmers in the 1992 Cable Act indicates that Congress reached a
similar, if not stronger, conclusion regarding the role of integration in
limiting access for alternative MVPDs.
This Article addresses whether the separate treatment of vertically
integrated and nonvertically integrated program suppliers in the program
access regulations is justified. The analysis is primarily based on the
empirical record established by the congressional hearings and FCC
proceedings leading up to the 1992 Act. Since October 1993, several
complaints and petitions involving program access have been filed, and in
June 1994, the Commission began to rule on some of these cases. At the
end of this Article, this more recent regulatory activity is discussed.
This Article argues that although there are viable economic models
that can explain attempts by established cable operators to bar competing
delivery systems from the market by restricting access to programming, the
singling out of vertically integrated firms for blame is not justified for two
main reasons. First, the record makes clear that both integrated and
nonintegrated program suppliers have engaged in the same potentially
anticompetitive behavior in question. While vertical integration may
facilitate any foreclosure behavior by cable operators, the basic source of
the behavior must be horizontal market power at the cable system level, or
at the Multiple Cable System Operator (MSO) level, in the market for
programming. To the extent that this horizontal market power exists, the
empirical record suggests it can be exerted either in the presence or the
absence of vertical ownership ties. Second, the record suggests that to the
extent cost differences fail to explain variations among programming prices
that suppliers charge to different MVPDs, simple variations in outcomes of
the network-MVPD bargaining process are more likely to be responsible.
Unlike a foreclosure strategy, bargaining outcomes are determined by the
horizontal market power of the seller vis-A-vis the buyer. These outcomes
have little to do with whether the seller is vertically integrated. 2
This Article concludes that whatever FCC program access regulations
there may be, they should apply equally to all program suppliers-regard-
less of the ownership relations those suppliers may have with cable
systems, or with any other MVPDs. Singling out program suppliers that are
vertically affiliated with cable operators, as the regulations now do,
essentially excludes from control numerous other suppliers having basically
12. The argument of this Article-that differences in input prices can be explained as
variations in bilateral bargaining outcomes-could also be explained from the seller's point
of view as unilateral price discrimination. Here, the argument is framed in terms of
bargaining outcomes because neither buyer nor seller in this market is necessarily a price
maker.
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the same behavioral incentives to participate in the exclusion of competitors
as integrated suppliers. To the extent that the regulations impact sales
practices of integrated programming suppliers, evasion of the regulations
-by means of vertical divestiture will be encouraged. The intent of the
regulations would thus be undermined and the playing field tilted arbitrarily
in favor of some firms and not others. Whatever the utility of the program
access regulations in general, they should be applied without respect to
ownership relationships.
Part I of this Article outlines the empirical state of vertical ownership
in cable. Part II discusses the economic theory of vertical foreclosure and
the role of integration. Part HI considers the empirical record and the
viability of alternative foreclosure and economic efficiency explanations for
this evidence. Part IV concludes with a policy analysis, emphasizing the
importance policymakers should place on the origins of market power at
the facilities level.
I. THE EMPIRICAL STATE OF VERTICAL OWNERSHIP IN CABLE
The underlying concerns about cable television's "bottleneck"
monopoly power over program suppliers are suggested by the market
structure of the MVPD industry. Very few cable subscribers are currently
served by overbuilt cable systems, 3 and the nationwide penetration of
SMATV, MMDS, and DBS aggregate to less than 3 percent of U.S. TV
households.'4 About 4 percent of households own home satellite dishes,
but a large proportion of these households are outside cable franchise areas
or do not subscribe to multichannel video services."
In terms of subscribership and revenues, vertical integration between
cable television networks and cable systems-usually via common
corporate ownership ties between MSOs and cable networks-is extensive,
though by no means ubiquitous. In its September 1994 report on the status
of competition in the cable industry, the FCC reported that 56 of the 106
nationally distributed programming services it identified had vertical ties
with MSOs and 50 did not.' 6 These data understate the economic
significance of vertical integration since MSOs (or their parent companies)
13. In re Implementation of Section 19 of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, First Report, 9 FCC Rcd. 7442 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Cable
First Report]. The FCC reported in 1990 that there were 41 to 49 "overbuilt" systems out
of a national total of approximately 10,000 and that the extent of overbuilding "seems to
have remained quite limited." Id. paras. 55, 60.
14. Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Kagan Media Index, Aug. 31, 1994, at 8.
15. 1994 Cable First Report, supra note 13, paras. 73-74.
16. Id. para. 161 n.434.
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held 5 percent or greater equity in 12 of the 15 most widely viewed
commercial basic cable networks17 and in 4 of the 5 largest premium
networks.18 Notably unaffiliated with any cable operators, however, were
ESPN and Lifetime-the fourth and seventh most widely viewed basic
networks 19-and the Disney Channel, the third largest national premium
network.
20
Joint ownership of a cable network by more than one MSO was fairly
common; the equity of twenty-eight of the fifty vertically affiliated
networks reported by the FCC was shared by two or more MSOs or their
parent companies.2" As these data suggest, minority ownership ties
between cable networks and MSOs were also common; for 21 of the 50
vertically affiliated networks, no individual MSO (or its parent company)
owned greater than a 50 percent share of the network, although in 19 of
these 21 cases, the individual minority shares of 2 or more MSOs
aggregated to more than 50 percent of the network's equity.'
The overwhelming proportion of equity ownership in nationally
distributed cable networks was accounted for by the largest twelve MSOs
or their parent companies. Eleven of these twelve MSOs (serving 67.4
percent of all U.S. cable subscribers as of March 1994) had a 5 percent
interest in at least one cable network. A disproportionate amount of
network equity ownership was accounted for by three MSOs. Tele-
communications, Inc. (TCI), owner of the largest MSO (serving 24.8
percent of all U.S. cable subscribers), was vertically affiliated with twenty-
three nationally distributed cable networks.' Time Warner, Inc., owner of
the second largest MSO (serving 12.5 percent of all U.S. cable subscribers)
was affiliated with sixteen national networks.24 Finally, Viacom, Inc.,
owner of the tenth largest MSO (serving 1.9 percent of all U.S. cable
subscribers), was also affiliated with sixteen national networks.2
These levels of vertical integration reflect relatively little change since
the passage of the 1992 Cable Act. Among the larger networks, Viacom's
1994 divestiture of its one-third share in Lifetime left that network
17. Id. app. G, tbl. 8.
18. Id. app. G, tbl. 6; Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., The Pay TV Newsletter, Aug. 31,
1994, at 2.
19. Id. app. G, tbl. 8.
20. Id. app. G, tbl. 4.
21. Id. app. G, tbls. 9-10.
22. Id.
23. Id. app. G, tbls. 1, 2, 9-10.
24. Id. app. G, tbl. 2.
25. Id. app. G, tbl. 1A.
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unaffiliated with any MSO,26 and the Viacom-Paramount merger in 1994
resulted in MSO ties to two formerly non-MSO-affiliated networks, USA
and the Sci-Fi Channel. 7 The FCC reported that twenty-two new cable
networks had entered the industry since passage of the 1992 Cable Act. 8
Ten of these had MSO ownership ties, and thirteen of them did not, thus
leaving the overall proportion of MSO-affiliated networks at about the same
level.2
9
These data thus indicate that while the FCC's specific nondiscrimina-
tory access provisions apply to most of the larger cable networks, there are
many others to which they do not apply. The specific regulations affect
most of the largest MSOs, especially TCI, Time Warner, and the cable
system holdings of Viacom-Paramount. A major reduction in the extent of
vertical integration-and thus in the coverage of the program access
provisions-will soon result if Viacom-Paramount's January 1995
announcement that it has agreed to sell its cable system interests to RCS
L.P. Intermedia Partners is consummated." This transaction would convert
eleven cable networks (including four of the fifteen most widely viewed
basic networks) and two of the six largest premium networks, to non-MSO
affiliated status.
II. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF VERTICAL FORECLOSURE AND
THE ROLE OF INTEGRATION
To the extent that local cable operators enjoy monopoly profits, they
have an obvious incentive to protect those profits by restricting entry.
Leaving aside vertical integration for the moment, one can construct a
variety of models that show conditions under which established cable
operators could profitably retard the entry of competing multichannel
providers-at either the local or the national level-by inducing program
suppliers to limit these entrants' access to programming.31 A necessary
26. Id. para. 165.
27. Id. para. 164.
28. Id. para. 166.
29. Id. app. G, tbls. 3-4.
30. See Eben Shapiro & Mark Robichaux, After Setback in Senate, Viacom Seeks Other
Ways to Sell Cable Systems to TCI, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1995, at A3.
31. The essential feature of one such model is that an established cable operator has
made a sunk cost investment in constructing a physical plant on the expectation that over
time operating revenues will cover not only operating expenses, but also amortization of the
plant. LELAND L. JOHNsON, COMMON CARRIER VIDEO DELIVERY BY TELEPHONE COMPA-
NIES 45-47 (1992). But now assume that a potential multichannel competitor later arrives
on the scene. Because its existing plant is otherwise useless, the established operator will
find it worthwhile to expend resources to prevent entry all the way up to the point that only
its operating costs are covered. The result is that even if the potential entrant has a superior
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condition in such foreclosure models is that the entrant cannot substitute
programming from alternative sources. Although clearly an empirical
question, there seems to be a consensus in the industry that the lack of
more than one or two of the well-known networks such as ESPN, USA,
CNN, and HBO, would seriously handicap a multichannel competitor to an
established cable system.32
One role that vertical integration could play in such models is to
facilitate the contracting process necessary to accomplish the foreclosure
objective. For reasons comparable to those discussed in the "transactions
costs" literature on vertical integration,33 compensating or coercing a
supplier to refuse to deal with an entrant is probably easier to carry out if
ownership is involved. The risk of opportunistic reneging on the agreement
by the network or the MSO is probably reduced, and there may be less risk
of legal jeopardy. Also, if a written exclusive dealing contract is involved,
integration is likely to smooth its dissolution if it should later become
adverse to the interest of one party.
technology and programmers could expand their subscribership with the new technology,
the established operator may still be able to compensate program suppliers for a grant of
exclusive rights by more than the entrant could profitably bid for those rights, thus
preventing the entry. This model implicitly assumes as well that the entrant is unable to
hold on as long as the established cable operator.
One could also posit a "reprisal" model of entry deterrence at the system level. In this
case, the incumbent cable system does not compensate networks to induce them to refuse
sales to competing delivery systems. Rather, the system keeps networks in line by
establishing a reputation for punitive action (for example, by moving channel position or
refusing to promote) against any network that might do business with the entrant. The basis
for this model follows from David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect
Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982) and Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation,
Reputation and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982).
32. See 1990 FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, para. 181 (testimony of Robert
Thompson, Vice President of TCI, from the FCC Los Angeles Cable Television Field
Hearing, Feb. 12, 1990); Comments of the Wireless Cable Association International, Inc.
to FCC in MM Dkt. No. 92-265 (Jan. 25, 1993). The "contestability" of program supply at
the actual production level is more likely because individual firms do not tend to develop
brand names or consumer loyalties. For this reason, integration between cable systems and
movie studios (as in the case of Time Warner, via its ownership of the studio, Warner Bros.,
Inc. as well as cable systems) is not likely to be a concern unless a large share of the
market for program production were to be accumulated.
33. For surveys of the extensive transactions costs literature, see ROGER D. BLAIR &
DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL
(1983) and Michael L. Katz, Vertical Contractual Relations, in I HANDBOOK OF
INDUsTRIAL ORGANIZATION 655 (Richard L. Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
The particular role of vertical integration in anticompetitive behavior is discussed in Thomas
G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to
Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
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Another role of vertical integration could be to coordinate collusion
among networks when more than one network is involved in the entry
deterrence. Say, for example, that an established cable system with a
potential MMDS competitor in its local market area believes it needs to
enlist refusals to deal from at least five networks to prevent or retard entry.
The cable system might simply choose five networks and compensate them
for this exclusivity. But any perception among the five that the foreclosure
strategy might fail, especially if there are "first mover" advantages in
signing on with the entrant, implies a risk of defection. 4 If the established
cable system is vertically integrated with at least some networks, however,
then the risks of defection perceived by nonintegrated networks are likely
to be reduced, thus facilitating the strategy."
Vertical integration might also facilitate collusion among MSOs to
enforce foreclosure attempts carried out on a national basis. For locally-
based entrants such as MIMDS and SMATV, colluding MSOs could
instigate a general policy against dealing with program suppliers that did
business with entrants in any local market they control. 6 DBS, in contrast,
is an inherently national technology and threatens all cable operators
simultaneously. National MSO collusion might be facilitated if two or more
MSOs are common owners of the same network or networks, or if equity
in a sufficiently large number of separately owned networks is concentrated
in the hands of a relatively few MSOs.
Concerns about nationally coordinated collusion among vertically
integrated MSOs are implicit in the 1992 Cable Act. They are also implicit
in the FCC's subsequent decision to prohibit any non-cost-based pricing by
vertically integrated program suppliers in any market, regardless of whether
34. For example, the first networks that an entering MVPD offers to its subscribers are
likely to benefit by accumulating subscriber loyalty or from subscriber switching costs.
35. Such potent'al facilitation of collusion was the central rationale for the Justice
Department's successful opposition to the merger in the early 1980s of Showtime and the
Movie Channel under joint ownership of five corporate entities, including three of the major
motion picture studios. The Justice Department's main rationale was that the new venture
would facilitate collusion among the three motion picture producer-distributors upstream.
See Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Video Markets: The Merger of Showtime and the
Movie Channel as a Case Study, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPErmoN: REGULATION, EcONOMucs,
AND TECHNOLOGY 338 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1985).
36. Similarly, the MSOs could discriminate against a network that is carried, such as
by refusing to promote it to subscribers, or by moving it to an inferior channel position.
Such strategies are, of course, likely to be less successful with more established networks
such as CNN or USA.
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the transaction takes place in a market where the supplier in question has
a vertical relationship.37
In summary, then, the theoretical role of vertical integration in the
above foreclosure models is to facilitate the exercise of horizontal market
power, either at the network or at the facilities level. At the facilities level,
such power might in theory be exercised by an established cable system or
by coordinated action involving numerous systems by one or more MSOs.
III. THE EMPIRICAL RECORD
A. Foreclosure or Efficiency?
The question becomes whether these foreclosure models, and vertical
integration's role in them, are plausible in the cable industry. As the FCC
and many others have pointed out, the motives and effects of exclusive
dealing between cable operators and cable networks can often promote
business efficiency.38 In the 1990 FCC Cable Report, for example, the
FCC cited complaints by SMATV, MMDS, and overbuilt cable operators
that TNT's policy of granting exclusive rights to established cable operators
diminished the complainants' ability to compete with those established
operators. But the FCC also noted TNT's claim that the exclusivity offer
was designed to induce skeptical cable operators to accept TNT during the
year following its 1987 launch, thus reducing the uncertainty of TNT's
market value.39 The Commission further noted a policy of Cablevision
Systems-a large MSO having equity interests in several networks.
Cablevision's programming subsidiary required wireless cable operators to
37. Similar concerns were also a basis for settlements in 1994 of federal and state
antitrust suits against Primestar Partners, ajoint venture among ten firms-including the five
largest vertically integrated MSOs-formed in 1990 to offer medium power DBS services
in the United States. United States v. Primestar Partners, L.P., 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,562 (S.D.N.Y. April 4, 1994). The Primestar system utilizes transmission from an
existing satellite transmitting in a low-frequency portion of the Ku-band and requires a
home receiving dish 18 to 36 inches in diameter. More advanced "true" DBS systems use
a higher-powered satellite transmitting in the upper Ku-band and will require a smaller
home dish. Some provisions of these settlements parallel the Cable Act by enjoining the
defendants' majority owned programming services from engaging in various exclusive
contracting and discriminatory pricing practices.
Another proposed consent decree filed in 1994 by the Justice Department, United States
v. Telecommunications, Inc. and Liberty Media Corporation, Proposed Final Judgment and
Competitive Impact Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 24,723-24 (1994), approves the remerger of
these two firms but constrains the program services in which they have ownership interests
from similar pricing and exclusivity practices.
38. 1990 FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, paras. 116-117.
39. Id. pare. 114(a).
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renegotiate their affiliation agreements with its vertically integrated
networks once their market penetration reached 2 j ercent.4  Cablevision
argued such requirements were intended to prevent (among other things)
"free riding" on the marketing efforts of cable systems in the same market
area.
41
These counterclaims about cable network marketing practices reflect
classic economic arguments that exclusive contracting generally promotes
efficiency. The circumstances under which exclusive contracting either
promotes efficiency or serves as an aid to market foreclosure is a subject
of intense debate in the economic literature.42
Given the evident incentives of established cable systems to retard
competitive entry if they can, it would be surprising not to observe attempts
at foreclosure behavior involving program access. In fact, the media offer
a long history of attempts by established firms to stop the advance of
technology by restricting access to programming. In the 1920s, when
commercial radio was beginning to emerge, some newspaper members of
the Associated Press (AP) tried to prevent radio stations from buying news
information from the AP.' In the 1950s, motion picture theater operator
trade associations repeatedly tried to organize boycotts against movie
studios that sold old films to emerging broadcast television stations.'
Broadcast stations and theater operators later joined forces to pressure
studios not to supply movies to experimental subscription television (STV)
and pay cable systems in the 1960s and 1970s.45 Furthermore, extensive
40. Id. para. 114(b).
41. Id.
42. This debate is beyond the scope of this Article. For a survey of these arguments,
most of which rely on the "free rider" marketing problem or other moral hazard problems
in the relationship between manufacturers and dealers, see Katz, supra note 33. For a recent
survey of the economic justifications for exclusivity in antitrust cases, see GREGG FRASCO,
ExcLusIvE DEALNG: A COMPREHENSiVE CASE STUDY (1991). Some recent economic
models claim that exclusive dealing may have anticompetitive effects. See in particular,
Michael H. Riordan & David J. Salant, Exclusion and Integration in the Market for Video
Programming Delivered to the Home (July 7, 1994) (paper presented at the AEI
Telecommunications Summit: Competition and Strategic Alliances). Riordan and Salant
argue specifically that exclusive dealing in the cable television industry may have negative
welfare consequences, in part because economies of scale in the distribution of programming
are not realized. Id.
43. VIcTOR ROSEWATER, HISTORY OF COOPERATIVE NEWS-GATHERING IN THE UNITED
STATES 292-94 (1970).
44. William Lafferty, Feature Films on Prime-Time Television, in HOLLYWOOD IN THE
AGE OF TELEVISION 235, 236-39 (Tino Balio ed., 1990).
45. See Subscription Television: Hearings on H.R. 12435 Before the Subcomm. on
Communications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Richard A. Gershon, Pay Cable Television: A Regulatory History,
COMM. & L., June 1990, at 3, 7-12.
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antitrust litigation-much of it resulting in plaintiff victories-has been
directed at alleged attempts by motion picture theater chains to prevent
independently operated movie theaters from obtaining the films of major
studios.4" Some of these instances have involved vertical integration, and
others have not.
It is speculative to assess the extent of foreclosure behavior involving
program access that has occurred in the cable industry. However, the record
shows that both integrated and nonintegrated cable firms have engaged in
the same range of potentially anticompetitive behavior. It is also true that
the charging of higher programming prices to an existing or potential
entrant can be essentially equivalent in motive and effect to an exclusive
contract or an outright refusal to deal. The role of vertical integration in
differential pricing may be quite different from that of exclusive dealing,
however, so these practices are considered separately.
B. Vertical Integration and Exclusive Dealing in Cable
Many of the program access claims cited in the 1990 FCC Report
involving exclusivity or alleged refusals to deal have involved vertically
integrated firms. These include TNT, Bravo, AMC, and a number of the
regional sports networks.4' Among nonvertically integrated networks,
however, the Report cited ESPN as having contracts prohibiting wireless
cable operators from distributing ESPN within any cable franchise area.
Also cited were assertions by Telesat, an operator of overbuilt cable
systems in Florida, that the Nashville Network (then nonintegrated) refused
to renew affiliation agreements with Telesat in its overbuilt markets.4" The
cases cited in the Report involved both localized incidents as well as the
national contracting policies of certain vertically affiliated networks, such
as TNT. Because the MSOs which owned equity in Turner Broadcasting
System (the parent company of TNT) serve much less than 100 percent of
U.S. cable subscribers, however, many of TNT's transactions were with
unaffiliated MSOs.
Other evidence corroborates the involvement of both integrated and
nonintegrated networks in claims of programming unavailability. In its
1988 report on the cable industry, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) cited data provided by the Wireless
Cable Association (WCA) on the availability to its members of twenty-nine
46. MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTIoN PICTURE INDUSTRY: ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS 84 (1960).
47. 1990 FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, para. 114.
48. Id.
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national cable networks. Of seventeen vertically integrated networks, seven
were reported "available" and ten "unavailable," while of twelve non-
integrated networks, eight were "available" and four "unavailable." '49
Virtually all the major nonintegrated as well as integrated national networks
have been mentioned in complaints about program access at one time or
another. Examples of such complaints involving nonintegrated networks
include the Disney Channel, Cable Video Store, A&E, the Weather
Channel, Home Shopping Network, USA, ESPN, and FNN. °
By the time the 1992 Cable Act became law, the prevalence of
exclusive contracts and claims of other outright refusals to deal with
alternative MVPDs had apparently diminished. In its March 1993 comments
to the FCC, for example, the Wireless Cable Association noted that
"[a]lthough TNT and many regional sports services remain holdouts ...
most other programming services now will do business with wireless
cable."'" As the WCA also noted, political (or legal) pressures were very
likely responsible for this shift.52 However, since the FCC's program
access regulations have come into effect, several new access claims
involving exclusivity or refusal to deal have been filed.
The legal proceedings leading up to the FCC's program access
regulations nevertheless showed no apparent diminution in claims that
many programmers charge higher prices to MMDS, SMATV, overbuilt
cable systems, HSD owners, and HSD program distributors.53
49. NTIA, VIDEO PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION AND CABLE TELEVISION: CURRENT POLICY
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 103 (1988).
50. Id. (Disney Channel); Comments of Telesat Cablevision to FCC in MM Dkt. No.
89-600, at 26-27, 30 (1990) (Cable Video Store, A&E, Weather Channel, Home Shopping
Network); In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating to
the Provision of Cable Television Service, Reply Comments of NCTC in MM Dkt. No. 89-
600, at 2 (1990) (FNN); FCC Los Angeles Cable Television Field Hearing (Feb. 12, 1990)
(USA, ESPN).
51. Comments and Reply Comment to FCC in MM Dkt. No. 92-265 (the Wireless
Cable Association, Peoples Choice TV, NRTC, and the National Private Cable Association),
at 17-18 (Jan. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Wireless Cable Comments].
52. Such pressures, for example, are suggested by an instance involving HBO. In the
mid-1980s, HBO announced it would offer cable operators the right of "wireline
exclusivity" within their local market areas for a a rate surcharge of 250 per subscriber.
HBO's announcement was met with a questioning letter from Senator Kerry (D-Mass.)
regarding its effects on potential competitive video providers. HBO's offer was later
dropped. Cable Competition Hearings, supra note 3, at 152-74.
53. See generally Wireless Cable Comments, supra note 51.
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C. Vertical Integration and Input Price Differentials in Cable
1. The Available Evidence
While data are not conclusive, some rate comparisons submitted in
earlier congressional and FCC proceedings suggest the extent of input price
differentials between MSOs and MVPDs at issue. The 1990 FCC Report
cites data provided by WCA for seven networks serving MMDS systems.
These data (reproduced in Table 1) indicate that certain MMDS systems
pay premiums for programming over the rates charged to comparably sized
cable systems between 36.4 percent to 78.6 percent.' Data from the
National Satellite Programming Network, Inc., a trade organization for
SMATV systems, reported premiums ranging from 32 percent to 209
percent for nine networks available to certain SMATV systems."5 The
FCC Report also noted claims by National Rural Telecommunications
Cooperative (NRTC), a distributor of cable programming to HSD owners,
that while all networks were available to it, NRTC had to pay, on the
average, rates 460 percent higher than did cable operators for access to
eighteen basic cable networks. 6 Finally, Cross Country Cable, Inc., an
MMDS operator, submitted data indicating that a package of seventeen
basic cable networks available both to MMDS and to "the largest cable
MSO's" cost approximately 200 percent more for the MIDS operators
than for the MSOs.57
In nearly all cases indicated in Table 1, both affiliated and unaffiliated
networks reportedly charged lower rates to cable systems than to alternative
MVPDs. But while these input price differences seem substantial, the data
indicate no discernible tendency for integrated programmers to be more
inclined than nonintegrated programmers to charge higher prices to
alternative MVPDs.
Evidence of price differentials was generally undisputed by program
suppliers in FCC and other policy proceedings. A main reason for the
differences cited by both integrated and nonintegrated programming
suppliers was that serving non-cable system customers is more costly.
Among reasons cited were a higher frequency of bad debts, higher
marketing costs, higher advertising costs, and poor signal quality. 8
54. 1990 FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, app. G, tbl. 11.
55. Id. app. G, tbl. 12.
56. Id. app. G, tbl. 9.
57. Id. para. 114(b).
58. Id. paras. 116-17.
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While such factors are clearly plausible contributors to input price
differences, two other explanations are possible. One explanation is that
established cable operators are attempting to prevent entry or to raise the
costs of existing rivals by inducing program suppliers to charge the rivals
higher prices than they otherwise would. A fringe competitor such as an
MMDS system would thus be prevented from gaining a stronger foothold
or forced to exit the market. Or, the price differences could be a short term
"raising rivals' costs" strategy. In the latter model, higher programming
costs paid by a fringe competitor create a price umbrella under which the
established firm can continue to charge monopoly prices to consumers."
That is, the higher consumer prices charged by the fringe competitor reduce
the competitive pressure on the established cable operator to lower its own
subscription prices.
While a possible explanation for the cable network price differentials,
the policing of input price collusion among numerous networks, even in the
presence of the fairly extensive vertical relationships in the cable industry,
seems very discouraging to this model. Network-affiliate contracts specify
confidentiality and are complex, often defining sliding scale input pricing
formulas and other terms and conditions such as the sharing of marketing
responsibilities.6" The likelihood of undetected discounts to the entrant
under these circumstances is high. Of course, an individual MSO should
have little difficulty controlling the input price terms charged by a network
in which it has a majority ownership investment. The minority ownership
relationships prevalent between MSOs and many networks, however, would
be less conducive to such price control, as would the absence of any
ownership control over other cable networks. Even if only a single MSO
or cable system were attempting to orchestrate the collusion among
networks in a localized area, these coordination problems would seem
forbidding. For several MSOs to coordinate this process would be even
more difficult.6 '
59. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 33, at 238-40. The relevant model in this
case is the "cartel ringmaster."
60. For a discussion of cable industry contracts, see DAvID WATERMAN & ANDREW
WEISS, VERTIcAL INTEGRATION IN CABLE TELEvISION, ch. 3 (Sept. 17, 1993) (unpublished
monograph, American Enterprise Inst.).
61. The 1994 Primestar decrees provide some perspective. The Primestar Partners'
original contract contained a "most favored nation" (MFN) clause which required the
involved program suppliers to offer their programming to the Primestar DBS system at
prices no higher than were charged to any other entity. The government interpreted this
clause to be conducive to input price collusion among these suppliers for the possible
purpose of preventing entry of a competing DBS system. See generally In re Implementa-
tion of Section 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, Notice of Inquiry, 9 FCC Rcd. 2896, paras. 85-87 (1994). While this theory
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2. Monopsony Power
A second, alternative explanation for the input price differences is
variations in outcomes of bargaining between individual networks (or
commonly owned network groups) and the various MVPDs. Just as
operators of different delivery systems are likely to have different credit
risks, it is also apparent that they have different degrees of bargaining-i.e.,
monopsony-power in the input marker -2 Less established services such
as SMATV and MVIDS can be expected to hold relatively little sway over
cable networks since their retail distribution of those networks accounts for
a relatively marginal share of those networks' profits. The larger MSOs,
however, are able to threaten a given program supplier with the loss of a
relatively large share of its potential revenues, and would thus be likely to
negotiate more favorable programming price terms.63
The record of congressional testimony and comments to the FCC is
consistent with the theory that programming price differences reflect
differential bargaining power. Small cable operators, in fact, make
essentially the same complaints about discriminatory pricing as do SMATV,
MMDS, and HSD owners. In its 1989 Comments to the FCC, the National
Cable Television Cooperative, a cooperative formed to secure programming
in bulk for small cable operators, complained of the "lack of good terms"
for cable network programming.' In its 1993 Comments to the Commis-
sion, the Community Cable Television Association (CATA), a trade
association of mostly rural cable operators, complained to the FCC about
unfair terms and practices from both integrated and nonintegrated cable
network s.6
5
recognizes the incentive these firms would have to coordinate input prices, the government's
theory behind the decrees' prohibition of MFN price clauses is that even though all the
participants were vertically integrated firms, a written document would be instrumental in
coordinating the collusion. Obviously, such written documents have not been the rule in the
cable industry.
62. In general, monopsony power means the power to force the price of an input (in this
case a cable network) below competitive levels, and thus make excess profits. Monopsony
is defined as "a market situation in which there is a single buyer for a given product or
service from a large number of sellers." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1463 (3d ed. 1981).
63. Such a result follows from basic principles of bilateral bargaining theory. For a
formal exposition, see David Waterman, Local Monopsony and Free Riders (1994) (paper
prepared for presentation to the American Law and Economics Association Annual
Convention, May 12-13, 1995, Berkeley, California).
64. 1990 FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, para. 114(g).
65. Comments of the CATA to FCC in MM Dkt. No. 92-265, at 2 (Jan. 25, 1993).
However, many of CATA's member operators, who tend to be smaller operators
in rural areas, have found that certain of the practices of certain video program-
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Although systematic data are unavailable, anecdotal evidence also
suggests the presence of significant monopsony power of larger MSOs in
the programming market. Drawing on press reports, for example, a 1988
NTIA report on the cable industry cited input price differentials larger than
one would expect from transactions costs savings66 for large versus small
MSOs.67 The trade and financial press has also reported several cable
industry incidents in recent years, some of them brought out in congres-
sional hearings, that might be explained by monopsony power.
68
One could respond to the explanation that monopsony power
determines input price differentials by arguing that the entry-retarding effect
on emerging technologies of higher input prices is basically the same as
that of foreclosure behavior. This distinction is important for purposes of
this Article, however, because vertical integration has little to do with
bilateral bargaining over input prices. The role of integration in this context
is limited to providing contracting efficiencies, or possibly giving a
program buyer that is integrated with one network a strategic advantage in
negotiating with another.69 The effect of these factors on input prices
is obviously minor relative to the large differences reported here.
ming suppliers, whether integrated or not, result in unfair competition or unfair
or deceptive acts or practices, the effect of which has been to hinder significantly
(and in some instances to prevent) cable television operators from providing
satellite programming and satellite broadcast programming to their subscribers at
reasonable cost.
Id.
66. For a variety of reasons, contracting between a buyer and seller is likely to be less
expensive, less risky, or otherwise more efficient than is arms length contracting between
unaffiliated parties. For a general analysis, see Oliver E. Williamson, Vertical Integration
of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. Rnv. 112 (1971).
67. Among specific examples cited by NTIA are a 20 per subscriber per month rate for
CNN paid to MSOs with over 5 million subscribers compared to 290 for MSOs with under
500,000 subscribers. In addition, 900 per subscriber was paid for HBO by the largest MSO,
TCI, Inc., compared to $5.00 paid by "small" MSOs. As NTIA points out, however,
transaction economies are one factor determining these rates, or these may be incomplete
descriptions of more complex pricing structures. See NTIA, supra note 49, at 80-82.
68. These have primarily involved the alleged use of threats by TCI against networks,
including the Learning Channel, ESPN, shopping networks, and other program suppliers.
See M. Ivey, The King of Cable TV, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 26, 1987, at 88, 88; Laura Landro,
Tele-Communications Sets Cable-TVAgenda, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1986, at A6; Johnnie
L. Roberts, How Giant TCI Uses Self-Dealing, Hardball to Dominate Market, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 27, 1992, at Al; see also Hearings on Examining the Effects of Megamergers in the
Telecommunications Industry, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 177-80 (1993) (statement of Sen.
Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)); 138 CONG. REc. S561, S579 (1992) (discussing the testimony of
Roy M. Speer, Chairman and CEO of Home Shopping Network, Inc., given before the
Senate on March 14, 1991). Several instances are discussed by Donna N. Lampert, Cable
Television: Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 245 (1992).
69. See Riordan & Salant, supra note 42.
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D. Summary
It is evident that vertical integration could facilitate foreclosure
attempts involving program access that may occur in the cable industry.
However, both integrated and nonintegrated cable program suppliers engage
in the same range of potentially anticompetitive behavior involving
exclusive dealing. Empirical evidence that program suppliers charge
consistently higher input prices to alternative MVPDs appears unrelated to
vertical integration. To the extent that cost factors are not responsible for
these input price differences, they can be explained by variation in
outcomes of the bilateral input price-setting process between program
suppliers and MVPDs having varying degrees of monopsony power in the
programming market.
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS
A. Overall Conclusions
There may be many questions about the wisdom of the FCC's
program access regulations in general. The rules are bound to infringe, for
example, on whatever efficiency benefits that exclusive dealing may bring.
One can also cite administrative burdens on the FCC, and especially, one
can question whether the FCC has the necessary expertise and information
to make appropriate judgments in access cases.
In the long run, however, the nondiscriminatory access requirements
should increase competition with established cable systems. If competition
is effectively established, consumer prices should fall, and if alternative
delivery systems sufficiently expand total consumer demand, the amount
and the variety of programming should increase as well.7"
The main point of this Article is that whatever the net benefit of
program access regulations, one cannot make a reasonable case for separate
treatment of vertically integrated and nonintegrated firms. Any program
access requirements should apply equally to integrated and nonintegrated
program suppliers.7" If the FCC's program access regulations prove
70. The generally favorable response that cable program suppliers reportedly have had
to the FCC's program-access provisions suggests that they have confidence in this model.
See, e.g., Rod Granger, Distributors See Program-Access Rules as a Plus, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, May 10, 1993, at 6A, 6A; Harry A. Jessell, Biondi Sees Net Benefit in Cable Act,
BROADCASTING, Oct. 26, 1992, at 38, 38.
71. The Primestar settlements, particularly those at the state level, appear to overlap
substantially with the FCC's nondiscriminatory program access requirements. The proposed
settlements, however, apply only to the seven vertically integrated MSO defendants. At least
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effective in constraining the behavior of vertically integrated program
suppliers, then vertical divestiture-or in the case of an entering program
service, avoidance of MSO affiliations-is likely to result.72 If program
access regulations are in fact desirable from a public policy perspective,
then this divestiture would be the worst possible case. The effectiveness of
the rules would be undermined, their enforcement would be arbitrarily
unbalanced, and the benefits of vertical integration to programming
innovation and financial support, extolled by the FCC,73 would be
diminished.
B. FCC Program Access Rulings to Date
At this writing, the volume of program access cases before the FCC
has apparently been light. The Commission reported in September 1994
that twenty-one cases had come under consideration by that date, and that
eleven of them had been ruled upon.74
Two of these eleven rulings are significant in indicating how the
Commission intends to apply the Section 19-based regulations with respect
to exclusive contracting. In one of these cases, Time Warner Cable was
denied the right to withhold its vertically affiliated network, Court TV,
from Liberty Cable Co., an MMDS operator competing with Time Warner
cable franchises in the Manhattan area.75 In the other case, New England
Cable News (NECN), a regional news channel launched in 1992, was
permitted to maintain exclusivity agreements with several cable operators
for the next eighteen months, after which it would have to petition the FCC
in the federal case they would affect only program suppliers that are controlled by means
of a 50% or greater equity share held by one MSO or in common by more than one MSO.
The state decrees require programming to be made available to other MVPDs on
"reasonable" terms, while the Primestar agreement essentially only controls collusion among
the MSOs or their controlled entities, involving one or more party. See In re Implementation
of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Memorandum Opinion
and Order on Reconsideration of the First Report and Order, 76 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F7
1177 (Dec. 23, 1994).
72. While the program access regulations could be a factor in the recent attehfipts by
Paramount-Viacom to divest of its cable system interests, the need for cash to finance the
merger is widely reported to be a primary motive. See, e.g., John M. Higgins, TCI Eyes
Viacom Buy, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Apr. 4, 1994, at 1, 50.
73. 1990 FCC Cable Report, supra note 3, paras. 82-86.
74. 1994 Cable First Report, supra note 13, paras. 174-74.
75. In re Time Warner Cable Petition for Public Interest Determination under 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.1002(c)(4) Relating to Exclusive Distribution of Courtroom TV, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 3221, para. 2 (1994) [hereinafter Courtroom TVMemorandum].
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to continue the agreements.76 NECN is half-owned by an MSO, Continent-
al Cablevision.
In both rulings, the FCC made clear that its decision was intended to
balance the benefits from encouraging competition by alternative MVPDs,
with the benefits program exclusivity could have in encouraging entry and
investment in new cable program services. In the Court TV instance, the
Commission argued that the network was already well-established, so that
the balance was in favor of encouraging alternative MVPDs." In the
NECN case, the Commission argued that the network was not established
enough to ensure its survival, so that the balance was in favor of encourag-
ing competition in program supply.7" The Commission has thus taken a
rather straightforward "infant firm" approach to program access, nurturing
newer competitors upstream and downstream.
One can take issue with the source of the FCC's wisdom in deciding
which cable firms are most in need of nurturing, either with respect to their
financial stability or their potential benefits to subscribers. Under the
circumstances, however, these rulings seem reasonable from the perspective
of concerns with vertical ownership. Earlier in 1994, the trade press
reported that some nascent local cable news channels were threatened by
the program access regulations, with some entry plans stalled.79 The article
speculated that "third party packagers" were likely to take the place of
MSO ownership due to the vertical integration language in the regula-
tions.8" By affirming the exclusivity provision in the NECN case,
pressures toward ownership separation between MSOs and entering
program suppliers are presumably reduced. It also seems reasonable that a
relatively new program service is unlikely to be a good foreclosure weapon.
Conversely, relatively established networks such as Court TV would
probably be more effective foreclosure devices. As of September, the
Commission had yet to make substantive rulings on any price discrimina-
tion cases or cases not involving vertically integrated programming suppliers.8
76. In re New England Cable News Petition for Pub. Interest Determination under 47
C.F.R. § 76.1002(c)(4) Relating to Exclusive Distribution of New England Cable News,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 3231, para. 53 (1994) [hereinafter New
England Cable Memorandum].
77. Courtroom TVMemorandum, supra note 75, para. 37.
78. New England Cable Memorandum, supra note 76, para. 36.
79. See, e.g., Kim Mitchell, Cable Act Fine Print Threatens News Channels; Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Mar.
28, 1994, at 14.
80. Id.
81. Three of the FCC's eleven program access rulings by September 1994 involved
complaints of discriminatory pricing. Consumer Satellite Sys., Inc. v. Lifetime Television,
9 FCC Rcd. 3212 (1994); Mid-Atlantic Cable Serv. Co. v. Home Team Sports and
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C. A Concluding Remark
The choice by Congress to impose specific program access regulations
only on vertically integrated cable firms reflects a misunderstanding of
industrial economics similar to that which has characterized antitrust
decisions for several decades, though less so in recent years. This
misperception is .that vertical relationships are the fundamental source of
anticompetitive behavior in industry.
Economic analysis has demonstrated that vertical integration is not
necessarily benign, and the analysis of this Article suggests that the cable
industry is probably no exception. The focus by Congress on the potentially
anticompetitive effects of vertical relationships in cable, however, diverts
attention from the more fundamental source of whatever excessive market
power that may exist in this industry-horizontal market power at the MSO
level. Without the bargaining power to induce program suppliers to grant
explicit or tacit exclusivity agreements which might have foreclosure
effects, or to force input prices to anticompetitively low levels, it is
unlikely that cable operators could effectively use program access restraints
to stop the entry of alternative MVPDs, with or without vertical integration.
An individual local cable system may have bargaining leverage over local
or regional program suppliers, whether that system is affiliated with a large
MSO or not. Bargaining leverage over nationally distributed cable
networks, however, is unlikely without control over a substantial proportion
of all U.S. cable subscribers.
If effective competition for established cable systems successfully
develops, most of the cable industry problems with which Congress has
been concerned will disappear or diminish. The issue upon which policy-
makers must focus in achieving that objective is not vertical integration, but
the sources of market power at the MSO level.
Columbia Cable of Va., 9 FCC Rcd. 3991 (1994); Private Network Cable Sys. Co. v.
SportsChannel N.Y., File No. CSR-4233-P (1994). All three cases, however, were privately
settled and the complaints dismissed by the FCC.
Of the other eight rilings, one waived Walt Disney Co. from program access
regulations in distributing to hotel pay-per-view systems. In re Petition of Walt Disney Co.
for Waiver of Program Access Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 4007
(1994). The other seven were dismissed on procedural grounds or as a result of private
settlements.
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Table 1
Input Price Comparisons: Available Data from Public
Documents
A. Sample Rate Comparisons Between Wireless Cable and Cable'
(cents per subscriber)
Top Wireless Top Cable Wireless
Rate Rate Premium
CNN $.50 $.28 78.6%
USA .38 .23 65.2%
Nickelodeon .35 .22 59.1%
MTV .35 .22 59.1%
Nashville .35 .20 75.0%
A&E ,15 .11 36.4%
Headline News .50 .00 -
IInformation obtained in the comments of the Wireless Cable Association.
Source: In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's
Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable TV Service, Report, 5 FCC Rcd.
4962, app. G, tbl. 11.
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B. Rate Comparisons: Mid-Atlantic Communications' Cable Systems
vs. SMATVs'
Programmer SMATV Cable System SMATV Premium
HBO* $6.25 per sub** $4.00/mo. per suba 56.2%
Cinemax* 6.50 per sub** 3.86/mo. per sub 94.5%
Nick* 0.29 per sub 0.17 per sub 70.5%
MTV* 0.29 per sub 0.17 per sub 70.5%
USA 0.18 per passing 0.18 per sub not comparable
FNN 0.17 per sub 0.055 per sub 209%
HTS 1.50 per sub 0.75 per sub 100%
CNN* 0.33 per sub 0.25 per sub 32.0%
ESPN* 0.47 per sub 0.32 per sub 46.9%
Information obtained from the comments of the National Satellite Programming
Network, Inc., et al.
a Sub = subscriber
* Cable network has vertical relationship with a cable MSO.
** Sold by cable operator
Source: In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's
Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable TV Service, Report, 5 FCC Rcd.
4962, app. G, tbl. 12.
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C. Wireless Cable vs. MSO Prices**
Network Basic Services Wireless MSO
American Movie Classics * $0.300 $0.136
Arts & Entertainment $0.110 $0.070
Black Entertainment * $0.060 $0.060
Family Channel * $0.080 $0.040
CNN * $0.360 $0.195
Discovery * $0.185 $0.045
ESPN/NFL $0.560 $0.260
Lifetime * $0.140 $0.035
MTV * $0.350 $0.050
Nashville $0.200 $0.065
Nickelodeon * $0.350 $0.100
The Weather Channel $0.200 $0.036
USA $0.380 $0.157
VH-1 1 $0.350 $0.000
WGN $0.150 $0.030
WOR $0.100 $0.030
WTBS * $0.100 $0.010
Prime Ticket N/A $0.450
TNT * N/A $0.200
Premium Services
HBO " $5.080 $4.100
Cinemax * N/A $2.900
Showtime * $5.050 $2.900
The Disney Channel $4.000 $2.500
* Indicates presence of a vertical relationship with a cable operator.
** Prices "we believe to be charged by the largest cable MSOs," compared
to "prices [for MSOs] supplied to us by the Wireless Cable Association."
Sources: Letter from George Remy, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer,
Cross County Cable, to the Honorable Alfred C. Sikes, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission 4 (April 4, 1990) (on file with the Federal
Communications Commision). Indications of a vertical ownership
relationship are added by Author.
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